Saudi Arabia, Qatar on way to establish diplomatic ties with Israel?

World especially Middle East got startled when Qatar’s Prime Minister, who also serves as Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani, gave an interview to Israel’s Channel 12 broadcaster in the first such sit-down of its kind last month.

During his interview he confirmed that US President Donald Trump’s Mideast envoy helped pressure the Israelis to get the ceasefire deal in Gaza over the finish line, and as he has done previously, expressed disappointment that it took more than a year to seal the agreement when the draft was drawn up in December 2023 and has changed little, if at all, since.

Thani described the negotiation process as often difficult and frustrating.

He added that the two-state solution is the only way to achieve peace in the region, and that whether in Gaza or the West Bank, only Palestinians should be managing their own affairs.

But what amazed the international monitors was the frankness with which Qatari PM talked about Israel and its future relations with the Muslim world. Since his interview speculation has started that Qatar is on way to normalize its relationship with Israel.

Meanwhile the prospect of a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel has entailed high hopes and great expectations since the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords. While such a deal has yet to materialize, heightened interest in such an arrangement has emerged at regular intervals as a solution for the Middle East region’s most intractable problems. Multiple iterations of this have been seen since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023; most recently, the January 2025 ceasefire and hostage-exchange deal between Israel and Hamas has been cast as renewing the possibility of a Saudi-Israeli normalization and, with it, the potential of a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians.

The neighboring Gulf states of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed the Abraham Accords in September 2020, establishing formal diplomatic relations with Israel, later joined by Morocco and Sudan. These diplomatic breakthroughs—so the story went—would usher in a new chapter of Arab-Israeli collaboration, forge a strong regional bulwark against Iran, and advance a durable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The dawn of the new Middle East,” in the words of U.S. President Donald Trump, had arrived.

The new Trump administration is likely to continue pursuing Saudi-Israeli normalization. At the 2024 Doha Forum in Qatar, former White House Middle East Envoy Jason Greenblatt said, “There’s just no way that President Trump isn’t going to be interested in trying to expand the Abraham Accords.” The incoming National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, described Saudi-Israeli normalization as a “huge priority”, and the “next phase of the Abraham Accords”. Meanwhile, President-elect Trump said he would build on the January 2025 Gaza ceasefire momentum to expand the accords.

The primary actors involved in a potential Saudi-Israeli normalization have strong incentives to portray a deal as a paradigm-shifting event with tremendous, transformative potential for the broader region. This normalization agreement is often described as an all-or-nothing opportunity that will emerge triumphantly within a game-changing grand bargain or else collapse spectacularly. There is good reason to consider another scenario more closely resembling the status quo: a Saudi-Israeli normalization that is considerably less encompassing and transformative than envisioned.

Some manner of Saudi-Israeli normalization is likely to occur eventually. As Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Faisal bin Farhan said in 2020, the Kingdom has always believed in “an eventual normalization with Israel”, though one that would be part of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Much has changed since 2020, but normalization has not been taken off the table entirely or indefinitely. The important question to consider is what form Saudi-Israeli relations will take over the coming years.

An eventual Saudi-Israeli normalization deal might include lofty, aspirational language, but the outcomes of such a deal are likely to be closer to the status quo. Both the Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties used near identical language to call for a just, comprehensive, and lasting “peace in the Middle East”. A durable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involving the creation of an independent Palestinian state is one desired outcome of normalization that is highly unlikely. The Saudis can advocate for the Palestinians, but they cannot negotiate in their stead.

A non-transformative normalization may accomplish a narrower set of Saudi and Israeli interests. Such a normalization deal might enable closer defense and security cooperation—between the Saudis and Israelis as well as the Saudis and Americans. There is also Saudi-Israeli compatibility in the technology domain: cybersecurity, fintech, and agritech present high-priority areas for collaboration under formal relations. Water resource management is another potential area for technology and skills transfer. Those Saudi and Israeli business actors willing to engage across various industries would encounter fewer formal constraints when pursuing these commercial opportunities.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Israel would likely establish direct transportation and commercial linkages via air and sea as well as explore other ways to enhance connectivity. Indeed, both countries are critical nodes in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—a nascent transregional initiative. The ties following normalization would likely be flexible, allowing each state and other actors to ramp up or decrease cooperation as needed. For example, while the Saudis may promote certain forms of economic cooperation, they may not rush to offer Israelis tourist visas.

A gradual normalization would enable key stakeholders to limit associated risks and responsibilities. Such a step-by-step process may even align with the expectations of the Trump administration. In his closing remarks at the 2024 Doha Forum, Greenblatt, one of the architects of the Abraham Accords, suggested that “we don’t even have to set the prize so high at the beginning…I think cooperation between these countries and Israel and America to bring safety and security and prosperity even if there’s no formal normalization would be a big win.”

To be sure, the emergence of a Saudi-Israeli normalization within a grand diplomatic bargain remains a distinct possibility. Until this scenario becomes reality, however, it is worth considering the full range of other options and their likely implications. A complex deal doesn’t necessarily foreshadow transformative results.